13-04-2018, 10:26 AM
Thanks Jerry appreciated.
Not sure a driver does check lamp at arrival station. It does permit other drivers, signalers, platform staff etc., to visually check the train is complete during its journey. Assuming lamp has fallen off should read train incomplete. With multiple units it is easy to check, with long freight, less easy.
I could swap driver for platform staff + signallers etc and include freight. In my head i had remote, single RETB line, terminal station so only driver available to check lamp. I used risk from the Camden road tunnel incident as a generality.
Maybe i could've explained the operation in slightly more detail? It did ask for basic operation though so i was trying to keep it simple.
Re TCs; the question is asking about train integrity. The non-guaranteed benefit of TCs is if a train splits, the uncontrolled part should remain indicated and prohibit other trains being routed into the same section. Procedures to proceed slowly and inspect then should identify the errant train part.
Again i was trying to give a basic explanation of how a T.C proves train integrity to the signaller.
=If the whole train leaves, section shows clear to the signaller therefore train integrity is proved.
If train leaves and a portion is left, section still shows as occupied therefore train integrity failure shown to signaller.
I was trying to focus on the T.C + integrity only without starting to explain signals and train stops etc.
I then used wrong side failure as an example of risk when using T.C's as this explains how train integrity could fail to be detected by track circuits and therefore risk management would be robust materials and good maintenance.
Third part; an alarm isn't usually raised in the control centre if the braking system detects a split/failure being it air or electrical - if you are referring to a specific technology/practice/infrastructure, then say what it is.
I have assumed main line practice, integrity means all the vehicles remain as one rather than specific rolling stock failures.
On-board:- Good point. I should have inluded the practice but again was trying to keep it to basic operation rather than explain functionality. DLR, integrity failure = VOBC halts, train brakes applied, fault code and alarm in control centre (controller's screen).
The second part of the question seems to have not been answered.
Some good points raised but need to ensure the answer is relevant to the question being asked.
I thought my "consideration" examples were all relevant to transition and train integrity. I'm at a total lose then. Could you give some of examples of what considerations need to be given for train integrity/transition to see what direction i need to be looking.
Thanks for your comments and time Jerry. Interesting to see your interpretations. How would the content of the answer rate in the pass/fail scale?
Not sure a driver does check lamp at arrival station. It does permit other drivers, signalers, platform staff etc., to visually check the train is complete during its journey. Assuming lamp has fallen off should read train incomplete. With multiple units it is easy to check, with long freight, less easy.
I could swap driver for platform staff + signallers etc and include freight. In my head i had remote, single RETB line, terminal station so only driver available to check lamp. I used risk from the Camden road tunnel incident as a generality.
Maybe i could've explained the operation in slightly more detail? It did ask for basic operation though so i was trying to keep it simple.
Re TCs; the question is asking about train integrity. The non-guaranteed benefit of TCs is if a train splits, the uncontrolled part should remain indicated and prohibit other trains being routed into the same section. Procedures to proceed slowly and inspect then should identify the errant train part.
Again i was trying to give a basic explanation of how a T.C proves train integrity to the signaller.
=If the whole train leaves, section shows clear to the signaller therefore train integrity is proved.
If train leaves and a portion is left, section still shows as occupied therefore train integrity failure shown to signaller.
I was trying to focus on the T.C + integrity only without starting to explain signals and train stops etc.
I then used wrong side failure as an example of risk when using T.C's as this explains how train integrity could fail to be detected by track circuits and therefore risk management would be robust materials and good maintenance.
Third part; an alarm isn't usually raised in the control centre if the braking system detects a split/failure being it air or electrical - if you are referring to a specific technology/practice/infrastructure, then say what it is.
I have assumed main line practice, integrity means all the vehicles remain as one rather than specific rolling stock failures.
On-board:- Good point. I should have inluded the practice but again was trying to keep it to basic operation rather than explain functionality. DLR, integrity failure = VOBC halts, train brakes applied, fault code and alarm in control centre (controller's screen).
The second part of the question seems to have not been answered.
Some good points raised but need to ensure the answer is relevant to the question being asked.
I thought my "consideration" examples were all relevant to transition and train integrity. I'm at a total lose then. Could you give some of examples of what considerations need to be given for train integrity/transition to see what direction i need to be looking.
Thanks for your comments and time Jerry. Interesting to see your interpretations. How would the content of the answer rate in the pass/fail scale?